Encryption 如何使用NuSMV见证中间人攻击(李约瑟-施罗德协议)?
我有以下简化的公钥Needham Schroeder协议:Encryption 如何使用NuSMV见证中间人攻击(李约瑟-施罗德协议)?,encryption,model-checking,nusmv,Encryption,Model Checking,Nusmv,我有以下简化的公钥Needham Schroeder协议: A→ B:{Na,A}Kb B→ 答:{Na,Nb}Ka A→ B:{Nb}Kb 其中,Na,Nb是A,B和Ka,Kb分别是A,B的公钥 由参与方公钥加密的消息只能由参与方解密 在步骤(1),A通过向B发送nonce及其标识(由B的公钥加密)来启动协议。使用其私钥,B破译消息并获取A的身份 在步骤(2),B将A及其当前值(由A的公钥加密)发送回A。使用其私钥,A对消息进行解码,并检查其当前值是否返回 在步骤(3),A将B的当前值(由B的
A→ B:{Na,A}Kb
B→ 答:{Na,Nb}Ka
A→ B:{Nb}Kb
Na
,Nb
是A
,B
和Ka
,Kb
分别是A
,B
的公钥
由参与方公钥加密的消息只能由参与方解密
在步骤(1),A
通过向B
发送nonce及其标识(由B
的公钥加密)来启动协议。使用其私钥,B
破译消息并获取A
的身份
在步骤(2),B
将A
及其当前值(由A
的公钥加密)发送回A
。使用其私钥,A
对消息进行解码,并检查其当前值是否返回
在步骤(3),A
将B
的当前值(由B
的公钥加密)返回到B
以下是对上述简化协议的中间主攻击:
- (1A)
(A→ E:{Na,A}Ke
想和A
谈谈)E
- (1B)
(E→ B:{Na,A}Kb
想说服E
它是B
)A
- (2B)
(B→ E:{Na,Nb}Ka
返回由B
加密的nonce)Ka
- (2A)
(E→ A:{Na,Nb}Ka
将加密消息转发给E
)A
- (3A)
(A→ E:{Nb}Ke
确认它正在与A
通话)E
- (3B)
(E→ B:{Nb}Kb
返回E
的nonce-back)B
B
将其标识和nonce一起发送回a
):
A→ B:{Na,A}Kb
B→ A:{Na,Nb,B}Ka
(B
将其标识和nonce一起发送回A
)A→ B:{Nb}Kb
eve
来模拟攻击者并见证中间人攻击爱丽丝和鲍勃。 在这里,我们对以诚实、透明的方式行事的
用户类型进行建模,并且在您的用例中可以实例化为Alice
或Bob
作为简化,我硬编码了这样一个事实:如果用户
是Alice
,那么它将通过尝试联系其他实体来启动协议
输入的my\u nonce
、my\u id
和my\u key
定义了用户的身份,而other\u key
和other\u id
表示我们想要联系的另一用户的公开信息。_1
中的、_2
中的和_k
中的输入与代码示例中的输入相同,而_3
中的保留用于交换协议的修补版本中使用的第三个值
用户可以处于以下五种状态之一:
IDLE
:初始状态,Alice
将启动协议,而Bob
等待一些请求
WAIT\u RESPONSE
:当Alice
等待响应她的请求时
等待确认
:当鲍勃
等待确认他的响应时
OK
:当Alice
和Bob
握手成功时
错误
:当握手出现错误时(例如意外输入)
用户可以执行以下操作之一:
发送请求
:{Na,IA}Kb
SEND_RESPONSE
:{Na,Nb}Ka
发送确认信息
:{Nb}Kb
作为一种简化,与您自己的模型类似,我使输出值在几个转换期间保持不变,而不是立即将它们放回NONE
。这样,在重置输入值之前,我不必添加额外的变量来跟踪输入值
MODULE user(patched, my_nonce, my_id, my_key, other_key, other_id, in_1, in_2, in_3, in_k)
VAR
state : { IDLE, WAIT_RESPONSE, WAIT_CONFIRMATION, OK, ERROR };
action : { NONE, SEND_REQUEST, SEND_RESPONSE, SEND_CONFIRMATION };
out_1 : { NONE, NA, NB, NE, IA, IB, IE };
out_2 : { NONE, NA, NB, NE, IA, IB, IE };
out_3 : { NONE, NA, NB, NE, IA, IB, IE };
out_k : { NONE, KA, KB, KE };
INIT
state = IDLE & action = NONE & out_1 = NONE
& out_2 = NONE & out_3 = NONE & out_k = NONE;
-- protocol actions defining outputs
TRANS
next(action) = SEND_REQUEST -> (
next(out_1) = my_nonce & next(out_2) = my_id &
next(out_3) = NONE & next(out_k) = other_key
);
TRANS
((next(action) = SEND_RESPONSE) & patched) -> (
next(out_1) = in_1 & next(out_2) = my_nonce &
next(out_3) = my_id & next(out_k) = other_key
);
TRANS
((next(action) = SEND_RESPONSE) & !patched) -> (
next(out_1) = in_1 & next(out_2) = my_nonce &
next(out_3) = NONE & next(out_k) = other_key
);
TRANS
next(action) = SEND_CONFIRMATION -> (
next(out_1) = in_2 & next(out_2) = NONE &
next(out_3) = NONE & next(out_k) = other_key
);
-- outputs stabilization: easier modeling
TRANS
next(action) = NONE -> (
next(out_1) = out_1 & next(out_2) = out_2 &
next(out_3) = out_3 & next(out_k) = out_k
);
-- protocol life-cycle
TRANS
case
-- protocol: end-positions
(action = NONE &
state = ERROR)
: next(action) = NONE &
next(state) = ERROR;
(action = NONE &
state = OK)
: next(action) = NONE &
next(state) = OK;
-- protocol: send request
(action = NONE &
state = IDLE &
my_id = IA)
: next(action) = SEND_REQUEST &
next(state) = WAIT_RESPONSE;
-- protocol: handle request
(action = NONE &
state = IDLE &
in_k = my_key)
: next(action) = SEND_RESPONSE &
next(state) = WAIT_CONFIRMATION;
-- protocol: handle response
-- without patch
(action = NONE &
state = WAIT_RESPONSE &
in_k = my_key &
in_1 = my_nonce &
!patched)
: next(action) = SEND_CONFIRMATION &
next(state) = OK;
-- with patch
(action = NONE &
state = WAIT_RESPONSE &
in_k = my_key &
in_1 = my_nonce &
in_3 = other_id &
patched)
: next(action) = SEND_CONFIRMATION &
next(state) = OK;
-- protocol: handle confirmation
(action = NONE &
state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION &
in_k = my_key &
in_1 = my_nonce)
: next(action) = NONE &
next(state) = OK;
-- protocol: no change state while performing action
(action != NONE)
: next(action) = NONE &
next(state) = state;
-- protocol: no state change if no valid input
(action = NONE &
in_k != my_key)
: next(action) = NONE &
next(state) = state;
-- sink error condition for malformed inputs
TRUE
: next(action) = NONE &
next(state) = ERROR;
esac;
我们添加了一个非常简单的main
模块和一个简单的CTL
属性,以检查Alice
和Bob
是否以预期的方式工作,并能够在正常情况下完成握手:
MODULE main
VAR
a1 : process user(FALSE, NA, IA, KA, KB, IB, b1.out_1, b1.out_2, b1.out_3, b1.out_k);
b1 : process user(FALSE, NB, IB, KB, KA, IA, a1.out_1, a1.out_2, a1.out_3, a1.out_k);
FAIRNESS running;
CTLSPEC ! EF (a1.state = OK & b1.state = OK);
输出如下所示:
NuSMV > reset; read_model -i ns01.smv ; go ; check_property
...
-- specification !(EF (a1.state = OK & b1.state = OK)) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
a1.state = IDLE
a1.action = NONE
a1.out_1 = NONE
a1.out_2 = NONE
a1.out_3 = NONE
a1.out_k = NONE
b1.state = IDLE
b1.action = NONE
b1.out_1 = NONE
b1.out_2 = NONE
b1.out_3 = NONE
b1.out_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.2 <-
_process_selector_ = main
running = TRUE
b1.running = FALSE
a1.running = FALSE
-> State: 1.2 <-
a1.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
a1.action = SEND_REQUEST
a1.out_1 = NA
a1.out_2 = IA
a1.out_k = KB
-> Input: 1.3 <-
-> State: 1.3 <-
a1.action = NONE
b1.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
b1.action = SEND_RESPONSE
b1.out_1 = NA
b1.out_2 = NB
b1.out_k = KA
-> Input: 1.4 <-
-> State: 1.4 <-
a1.state = OK
a1.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
a1.out_1 = NB
a1.out_2 = NONE
b1.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.5 <-
-> State: 1.5 <-
a1.action = NONE
b1.state = OK
同样,我们添加了一个非常简单的main
模块和一个简单的CTL
属性来检查Eve
是否能够成功攻击Alice
和Bob
。。最后,Alice
认为是在和Eve
(实际上)说话,Bob
认为是在和Alice
说话,而实际上是在和Eve
说话
MODULE main
VAR
a2 : process user(FALSE, NA, IA, KA, KE, IE, e2.aout_1, e2.aout_2, e2.aout_3, e2.aout_k);
b2 : process user(FALSE, NB, IB, KB, KA, IA, e2.bout_1, e2.bout_2, e2.bout_3, e2.bout_k);
e2 : process attacker(NE, IE, KE, KA, KB,
a2.out_1, a2.out_2, a2.out_3, a2.out_k,
b2.out_1, b2.out_2, b2.out_3, b2.out_k);
FAIRNESS running;
CTLSPEC ! EF (a2.state = OK & b2.state = OK & e2.state = OK);
结果如下:
NuSMV > reset; read_model -i ns02.smv ; go ; check_property
...
-- specification !(EF ((a2.state = OK & b2.state = OK) & e2.state = OK)) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
a2.state = IDLE
a2.action = NONE
a2.out_1 = NONE
a2.out_2 = NONE
a2.out_3 = NONE
a2.out_k = NONE
b2.state = IDLE
b2.action = NONE
b2.out_1 = NONE
b2.out_2 = NONE
b2.out_3 = NONE
b2.out_k = NONE
e2.state = IDLE
e2.action = NONE
e2.aout_1 = NONE
e2.aout_2 = NONE
e2.aout_3 = NONE
e2.aout_k = NONE
e2.bout_1 = NONE
e2.bout_2 = NONE
e2.bout_3 = NONE
e2.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.2 <-
_process_selector_ = main
running = TRUE
e2.running = FALSE
b2.running = FALSE
a2.running = FALSE
-> State: 1.2 <-
a2.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
a2.action = SEND_REQUEST
a2.out_1 = NA
a2.out_2 = IA
a2.out_k = KE
-> Input: 1.3 <-
-> State: 1.3 <-
a2.action = NONE
e2.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
e2.action = SEND_REQUEST
e2.bout_1 = NA
e2.bout_2 = IA
e2.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.4 <-
-> State: 1.4 <-
b2.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
b2.action = SEND_RESPONSE
b2.out_1 = NA
b2.out_2 = NB
b2.out_k = KA
e2.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.5 <-
-> State: 1.5 <-
b2.action = NONE
e2.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
e2.action = SEND_RESPONSE
e2.aout_1 = NA
e2.aout_2 = NB
e2.aout_k = KA
e2.bout_1 = NONE
e2.bout_2 = NONE
e2.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.6 <-
-> State: 1.6 <-
a2.state = OK
a2.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
a2.out_1 = NB
a2.out_2 = NONE
e2.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.7 <-
-> State: 1.7 <-
a2.action = NONE
e2.state = OK
e2.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
e2.aout_1 = NONE
e2.aout_2 = NONE
e2.aout_k = NONE
e2.bout_1 = NB
e2.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.8 <-
-> State: 1.8 <-
b2.state = OK
e2.action = NONE
NuSMV > reset; read_model -i ns03.smv ; go ; check_property
...
-- specification !(EF ((a3.state = OK & b3.state = OK) & e3.state = OK)) is true
-- specification !(EF (a3.state = ERROR & b3.state = ERROR)) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
a3.state = IDLE
a3.action = NONE
a3.out_1 = NONE
a3.out_2 = NONE
a3.out_3 = NONE
a3.out_k = NONE
b3.state = IDLE
b3.action = NONE
b3.out_1 = NONE
b3.out_2 = NONE
b3.out_3 = NONE
b3.out_k = NONE
e3.state = IDLE
e3.action = NONE
e3.aout_1 = NONE
e3.aout_2 = NONE
e3.aout_3 = NONE
e3.aout_k = NONE
e3.bout_1 = NONE
e3.bout_2 = NONE
e3.bout_3 = NONE
e3.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.2 <-
_process_selector_ = main
running = TRUE
e3.running = FALSE
b3.running = FALSE
a3.running = FALSE
-> State: 1.2 <-
a3.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
a3.action = SEND_REQUEST
a3.out_1 = NA
a3.out_2 = IA
a3.out_k = KE
-> Input: 1.3 <-
-> State: 1.3 <-
a3.action = NONE
e3.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
e3.action = SEND_REQUEST
e3.bout_1 = NA
e3.bout_2 = IA
e3.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.4 <-
-> State: 1.4 <-
b3.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
b3.action = SEND_RESPONSE
b3.out_1 = NA
b3.out_2 = NB
b3.out_3 = IB
b3.out_k = KA
e3.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.5 <-
-> State: 1.5 <-
b3.action = NONE
e3.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
e3.action = SEND_RESPONSE
e3.aout_1 = NA
e3.aout_2 = NB
e3.aout_3 = IB
e3.aout_k = KA
e3.bout_1 = NONE
e3.bout_2 = NONE
e3.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.6 <-
-> State: 1.6 <-
a3.state = ERROR
e3.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.7 <-
-> State: 1.7 <-
e3.state = OK
e3.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
e3.aout_1 = NONE
e3.aout_2 = NONE
e3.aout_3 = NONE
e3.aout_k = NONE
e3.bout_1 = NA
e3.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.8 <-
-> State: 1.8 <-a
b3.state = ERROR
e3.action = NONE
结果如下:
NuSMV > reset; read_model -i ns02.smv ; go ; check_property
...
-- specification !(EF ((a2.state = OK & b2.state = OK) & e2.state = OK)) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
a2.state = IDLE
a2.action = NONE
a2.out_1 = NONE
a2.out_2 = NONE
a2.out_3 = NONE
a2.out_k = NONE
b2.state = IDLE
b2.action = NONE
b2.out_1 = NONE
b2.out_2 = NONE
b2.out_3 = NONE
b2.out_k = NONE
e2.state = IDLE
e2.action = NONE
e2.aout_1 = NONE
e2.aout_2 = NONE
e2.aout_3 = NONE
e2.aout_k = NONE
e2.bout_1 = NONE
e2.bout_2 = NONE
e2.bout_3 = NONE
e2.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.2 <-
_process_selector_ = main
running = TRUE
e2.running = FALSE
b2.running = FALSE
a2.running = FALSE
-> State: 1.2 <-
a2.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
a2.action = SEND_REQUEST
a2.out_1 = NA
a2.out_2 = IA
a2.out_k = KE
-> Input: 1.3 <-
-> State: 1.3 <-
a2.action = NONE
e2.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
e2.action = SEND_REQUEST
e2.bout_1 = NA
e2.bout_2 = IA
e2.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.4 <-
-> State: 1.4 <-
b2.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
b2.action = SEND_RESPONSE
b2.out_1 = NA
b2.out_2 = NB
b2.out_k = KA
e2.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.5 <-
-> State: 1.5 <-
b2.action = NONE
e2.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
e2.action = SEND_RESPONSE
e2.aout_1 = NA
e2.aout_2 = NB
e2.aout_k = KA
e2.bout_1 = NONE
e2.bout_2 = NONE
e2.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.6 <-
-> State: 1.6 <-
a2.state = OK
a2.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
a2.out_1 = NB
a2.out_2 = NONE
e2.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.7 <-
-> State: 1.7 <-
a2.action = NONE
e2.state = OK
e2.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
e2.aout_1 = NONE
e2.aout_2 = NONE
e2.aout_k = NONE
e2.bout_1 = NB
e2.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.8 <-
-> State: 1.8 <-
b2.state = OK
e2.action = NONE
NuSMV > reset; read_model -i ns03.smv ; go ; check_property
...
-- specification !(EF ((a3.state = OK & b3.state = OK) & e3.state = OK)) is true
-- specification !(EF (a3.state = ERROR & b3.state = ERROR)) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
a3.state = IDLE
a3.action = NONE
a3.out_1 = NONE
a3.out_2 = NONE
a3.out_3 = NONE
a3.out_k = NONE
b3.state = IDLE
b3.action = NONE
b3.out_1 = NONE
b3.out_2 = NONE
b3.out_3 = NONE
b3.out_k = NONE
e3.state = IDLE
e3.action = NONE
e3.aout_1 = NONE
e3.aout_2 = NONE
e3.aout_3 = NONE
e3.aout_k = NONE
e3.bout_1 = NONE
e3.bout_2 = NONE
e3.bout_3 = NONE
e3.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.2 <-
_process_selector_ = main
running = TRUE
e3.running = FALSE
b3.running = FALSE
a3.running = FALSE
-> State: 1.2 <-
a3.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
a3.action = SEND_REQUEST
a3.out_1 = NA
a3.out_2 = IA
a3.out_k = KE
-> Input: 1.3 <-
-> State: 1.3 <-
a3.action = NONE
e3.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
e3.action = SEND_REQUEST
e3.bout_1 = NA
e3.bout_2 = IA
e3.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.4 <-
-> State: 1.4 <-
b3.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
b3.action = SEND_RESPONSE
b3.out_1 = NA
b3.out_2 = NB
b3.out_3 = IB
b3.out_k = KA
e3.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.5 <-
-> State: 1.5 <-
b3.action = NONE
e3.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
e3.action = SEND_RESPONSE
e3.aout_1 = NA
e3.aout_2 = NB
e3.aout_3 = IB
e3.aout_k = KA
e3.bout_1 = NONE
e3.bout_2 = NONE
e3.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.6 <-
-> State: 1.6 <-
a3.state = ERROR
e3.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.7 <-
-> State: 1.7 <-
e3.state = OK
e3.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
e3.aout_1 = NONE
e3.aout_2 = NONE
e3.aout_3 = NONE
e3.aout_k = NONE
e3.bout_1 = NA
e3.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.8 <-
-> State: 1.8 <-a
b3.state = ERROR
e3.action = NONE
NuSMV>reset;read_model-i ns03.smv;去;检查属性
...
--规格!(EF((a3.state=OK&b3.state=OK)和e3.state=OK))为真
--规格!(EF(a3.state=ERROR&b3.state=ERROR))为false
--如下面的执行顺序所示
跟踪描述:CTL反例
跟踪类型:计数器示例
NuSMV > reset; read_model -i ns02.smv ; go ; check_property
...
-- specification !(EF ((a2.state = OK & b2.state = OK) & e2.state = OK)) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
a2.state = IDLE
a2.action = NONE
a2.out_1 = NONE
a2.out_2 = NONE
a2.out_3 = NONE
a2.out_k = NONE
b2.state = IDLE
b2.action = NONE
b2.out_1 = NONE
b2.out_2 = NONE
b2.out_3 = NONE
b2.out_k = NONE
e2.state = IDLE
e2.action = NONE
e2.aout_1 = NONE
e2.aout_2 = NONE
e2.aout_3 = NONE
e2.aout_k = NONE
e2.bout_1 = NONE
e2.bout_2 = NONE
e2.bout_3 = NONE
e2.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.2 <-
_process_selector_ = main
running = TRUE
e2.running = FALSE
b2.running = FALSE
a2.running = FALSE
-> State: 1.2 <-
a2.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
a2.action = SEND_REQUEST
a2.out_1 = NA
a2.out_2 = IA
a2.out_k = KE
-> Input: 1.3 <-
-> State: 1.3 <-
a2.action = NONE
e2.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
e2.action = SEND_REQUEST
e2.bout_1 = NA
e2.bout_2 = IA
e2.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.4 <-
-> State: 1.4 <-
b2.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
b2.action = SEND_RESPONSE
b2.out_1 = NA
b2.out_2 = NB
b2.out_k = KA
e2.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.5 <-
-> State: 1.5 <-
b2.action = NONE
e2.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
e2.action = SEND_RESPONSE
e2.aout_1 = NA
e2.aout_2 = NB
e2.aout_k = KA
e2.bout_1 = NONE
e2.bout_2 = NONE
e2.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.6 <-
-> State: 1.6 <-
a2.state = OK
a2.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
a2.out_1 = NB
a2.out_2 = NONE
e2.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.7 <-
-> State: 1.7 <-
a2.action = NONE
e2.state = OK
e2.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
e2.aout_1 = NONE
e2.aout_2 = NONE
e2.aout_k = NONE
e2.bout_1 = NB
e2.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.8 <-
-> State: 1.8 <-
b2.state = OK
e2.action = NONE
MODULE main
VAR
a3 : process user(TRUE, NA, IA, KA, KE, IE, e3.aout_1, e3.aout_2, e3.aout_3, e3.aout_k);
b3 : process user(TRUE, NB, IB, KB, KA, IA, e3.bout_1, e3.bout_2, e3.bout_3, e3.bout_k);
e3 : process attacker(NE, IE, KE, KA, KB,
a3.out_1, a3.out_2, a3.out_3, a3.out_k,
b3.out_1, b3.out_2, b3.out_3, b3.out_k);
FAIRNESS running;
CTLSPEC ! EF (a3.state = OK & b3.state = OK & e3.state = OK);
CTLSPEC ! EF (a3.state = ERROR & b3.state = ERROR);
NuSMV > reset; read_model -i ns03.smv ; go ; check_property
...
-- specification !(EF ((a3.state = OK & b3.state = OK) & e3.state = OK)) is true
-- specification !(EF (a3.state = ERROR & b3.state = ERROR)) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
Trace Description: CTL Counterexample
Trace Type: Counterexample
-> State: 1.1 <-
a3.state = IDLE
a3.action = NONE
a3.out_1 = NONE
a3.out_2 = NONE
a3.out_3 = NONE
a3.out_k = NONE
b3.state = IDLE
b3.action = NONE
b3.out_1 = NONE
b3.out_2 = NONE
b3.out_3 = NONE
b3.out_k = NONE
e3.state = IDLE
e3.action = NONE
e3.aout_1 = NONE
e3.aout_2 = NONE
e3.aout_3 = NONE
e3.aout_k = NONE
e3.bout_1 = NONE
e3.bout_2 = NONE
e3.bout_3 = NONE
e3.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.2 <-
_process_selector_ = main
running = TRUE
e3.running = FALSE
b3.running = FALSE
a3.running = FALSE
-> State: 1.2 <-
a3.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
a3.action = SEND_REQUEST
a3.out_1 = NA
a3.out_2 = IA
a3.out_k = KE
-> Input: 1.3 <-
-> State: 1.3 <-
a3.action = NONE
e3.state = WAIT_RESPONSE
e3.action = SEND_REQUEST
e3.bout_1 = NA
e3.bout_2 = IA
e3.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.4 <-
-> State: 1.4 <-
b3.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
b3.action = SEND_RESPONSE
b3.out_1 = NA
b3.out_2 = NB
b3.out_3 = IB
b3.out_k = KA
e3.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.5 <-
-> State: 1.5 <-
b3.action = NONE
e3.state = WAIT_CONFIRMATION
e3.action = SEND_RESPONSE
e3.aout_1 = NA
e3.aout_2 = NB
e3.aout_3 = IB
e3.aout_k = KA
e3.bout_1 = NONE
e3.bout_2 = NONE
e3.bout_k = NONE
-> Input: 1.6 <-
-> State: 1.6 <-
a3.state = ERROR
e3.action = NONE
-> Input: 1.7 <-
-> State: 1.7 <-
e3.state = OK
e3.action = SEND_CONFIRMATION
e3.aout_1 = NONE
e3.aout_2 = NONE
e3.aout_3 = NONE
e3.aout_k = NONE
e3.bout_1 = NA
e3.bout_k = KB
-> Input: 1.8 <-
-> State: 1.8 <-a
b3.state = ERROR
e3.action = NONE