C++ 通过凭据提供程序登录时未加载KSP(密钥存储提供程序)
我正在创建一个Windows凭据提供程序,以便使用本节所述的证书登录到Windows域。 这意味着创建自定义KSP,该KSP将在创建身份验证包时由LsaLogonUser调用 我设法创建了自定义KSP,并在一个直接调用LsaLogonUser的独立应用程序中成功地对其进行了测试。 基本上,创建身份验证包并将其传递给LsaLogonUser,加载KSP,调用一系列函数,并对用户进行身份验证,在加载的状态码和用户配置文件上返回成功结果 但是,当我在凭证的GetSerialization过程中使用相同的身份验证包时,KSP甚至不会加载,我会得到一个由ntsStatus上的ReportResult(NTSTATUS ntsStatus,NTSTATUS NTSSBStatus,…)报告的0xc000000d(参数不正确) 这是我在测试中使用的GetSerialization代码:C++ 通过凭据提供程序登录时未加载KSP(密钥存储提供程序),c++,certificate,kerberos,winlogon,credential-providers,C++,Certificate,Kerberos,Winlogon,Credential Providers,我正在创建一个Windows凭据提供程序,以便使用本节所述的证书登录到Windows域。 这意味着创建自定义KSP,该KSP将在创建身份验证包时由LsaLogonUser调用 我设法创建了自定义KSP,并在一个直接调用LsaLogonUser的独立应用程序中成功地对其进行了测试。 基本上,创建身份验证包并将其传递给LsaLogonUser,加载KSP,调用一系列函数,并对用户进行身份验证,在加载的状态码和用户配置文件上返回成功结果 但是,当我在凭证的GetSerialization过程中使用相同
HRESULT AOCredential::GetSerialization(
CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_GET_SERIALIZATION_RESPONSE *pcpgsr,
CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_SERIALIZATION *pcpcs,
PWSTR *ppwszOptionalStatusText,
CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_STATUS_ICON *pcpsiOptionalStatusIcon
)
{
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(ppwszOptionalStatusText);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pcpsiOptionalStatusIcon);
HRESULT hr;
ULONG ulAuthPackage;
hr = RetrieveKerberosAuthPackage(&ulAuthPackage);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
{
InitialiseKerbCertificateLogon(&pcpcs->rgbSerialization, &pcpcs->cbSerialization); // this package actually worked when calling LsaLogonUser function directly (the KSP gets loaded and the authentication succeeds)
pcpcs->ulAuthenticationPackage = ulAuthPackage;
pcpcs->clsidCredentialProvider = CLSID_CallsignProvider;
*pcpgsr = CPGSR_RETURN_CREDENTIAL_FINISHED;
}
return hr;
}
我的问题是,当直接从LsaLogonUser调用身份验证包时,为什么要加载KSP,而不是在windows登录期间从凭据提供程序调用
InitialiseKerbCertificateLogon代码为:
void InitialiseKerbCertificateLogon(PWSTR domain, PWSTR username, LPBYTE* authInfo, ULONG *authInfoLength)
{
WCHAR szCardName[] = L"";
WCHAR szContainerName[] = L"Default";
WCHAR szReaderName[] = L"";
WCHAR szCspName[] = CS_KSP_NAME;
WCHAR szPin[] = CS_TEST_PIN;
ULONG ulPinByteLen = (ULONG)(wcslen(szPin) * sizeof(WCHAR));
WCHAR szUserName[] = CS_TEST_USERNAME;
ULONG ulUserByteLen = (ULONG)(wcslen(szUserName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
WCHAR szDomainName[] = CS_TEST_DOMAIN;
ULONG ulDomainByteLen = (ULONG)(wcslen(szDomainName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
LPBYTE pbAuthInfo = NULL;
ULONG ulAuthInfoLen = 0;
KERB_CERTIFICATE_LOGON *pKerbCertLogon;
KERB_SMARTCARD_CSP_INFO *pKerbCspInfo;
LPBYTE pbDomainBuffer, pbUserBuffer, pbPinBuffer;
LPBYTE pbCspData;
LPBYTE pbCspDataContent;
ULONG ulCspDataLen = (ULONG)(sizeof(KERB_SMARTCARD_CSP_INFO) - sizeof(TCHAR) +
(wcslen(szCardName) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR) +
(wcslen(szCspName) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR) +
(wcslen(szContainerName) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR) +
(wcslen(szReaderName) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
ulAuthInfoLen = sizeof(KERB_CERTIFICATE_LOGON) +
ulDomainByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR) +
ulUserByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR) +
ulPinByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR) +
ulCspDataLen;
pbAuthInfo = (LPBYTE)CoTaskMemAlloc(ulAuthInfoLen);
ZeroMemory(pbAuthInfo, ulAuthInfoLen);
pbDomainBuffer = pbAuthInfo + sizeof(KERB_CERTIFICATE_LOGON);
pbUserBuffer = pbDomainBuffer + ulDomainByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR);
pbPinBuffer = pbUserBuffer + ulUserByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR);
pbCspData = pbPinBuffer + ulPinByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR);
memcpy(pbDomainBuffer, szDomainName, ulDomainByteLen);
memcpy(pbUserBuffer, szUserName, ulUserByteLen);
memcpy(pbPinBuffer, szPin, ulPinByteLen);
pKerbCertLogon = (KERB_CERTIFICATE_LOGON*)pbAuthInfo;
pKerbCertLogon->MessageType = KerbCertificateLogon;
pKerbCertLogon->DomainName.Length = (USHORT)ulDomainByteLen;
pKerbCertLogon->DomainName.MaximumLength = (USHORT)(ulDomainByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR));
pKerbCertLogon->DomainName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pbDomainBuffer;
pKerbCertLogon->UserName.Length = (USHORT)ulUserByteLen;
pKerbCertLogon->UserName.MaximumLength = (USHORT)(ulUserByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR));
pKerbCertLogon->UserName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pbUserBuffer;
pKerbCertLogon->Pin.Length = (USHORT)ulPinByteLen;
pKerbCertLogon->Pin.MaximumLength = (USHORT)(ulPinByteLen + sizeof(WCHAR));
pKerbCertLogon->Pin.Buffer = (PWSTR)pbPinBuffer;
pKerbCertLogon->CspDataLength = ulCspDataLen;
pKerbCertLogon->CspData = pbCspData;
pKerbCspInfo = (KERB_SMARTCARD_CSP_INFO*)pbCspData;
pKerbCspInfo->dwCspInfoLen = ulCspDataLen;
pKerbCspInfo->MessageType = 1;
pKerbCspInfo->KeySpec = AT_KEYEXCHANGE;
pKerbCspInfo->nCardNameOffset = 0;
pKerbCspInfo->nReaderNameOffset = pKerbCspInfo->nCardNameOffset + (ULONG)wcslen(szCardName) + 1;
pKerbCspInfo->nContainerNameOffset = pKerbCspInfo->nReaderNameOffset + (ULONG)wcslen(szReaderName) + 1;
pKerbCspInfo->nCSPNameOffset = pKerbCspInfo->nContainerNameOffset + (ULONG)wcslen(szContainerName) + 1;
pbCspDataContent = pbCspData + sizeof(KERB_SMARTCARD_CSP_INFO) - sizeof(TCHAR);
memcpy(pbCspDataContent + (pKerbCspInfo->nCardNameOffset * sizeof(WCHAR)), szCardName, wcslen(szCardName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
memcpy(pbCspDataContent + (pKerbCspInfo->nReaderNameOffset * sizeof(WCHAR)), szReaderName, wcslen(szReaderName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
memcpy(pbCspDataContent + (pKerbCspInfo->nContainerNameOffset * sizeof(WCHAR)), szContainerName, wcslen(szContainerName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
memcpy(pbCspDataContent + (pKerbCspInfo->nCSPNameOffset * sizeof(WCHAR)), szCspName, wcslen(szCspName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
*authInfo = pbAuthInfo;
*authInfoLength = ulAuthInfoLen;
}
从Microsoft关于结构的文档中: 存储在UNICODE_字符串类型的成员中的指针是相对的 到了结构的开头,都不是绝对的记忆 指针 但是文档并没有告诉您,
CspData
指针也应该相对于结构的开头
当您使用带有绝对内存指针的数据调用LsaLogonUser
时,它也会工作,当指针是相对的时也是如此。当数据被序列化时,将只对所有相对指针起作用
有时(取决于凭证\u提供者\u使用情况\u场景),您应该使用KERB\u证书\u解锁\u登录,而不是KERB\u证书\u登录。我考虑了相关指针以及unicode字符串。我已经更新了原始帖子,加入了InitializeKerbCertificateLogon函数。您是否尝试过:pKerbCertLogon->DomainName.Buffer=(PWSTR)(pbDomainBuffer pbAuthInfo);pKerbCertLogon->UserName.Buffer=(PWSTR)(pbUserBuffer-pbAuthInfo);pKerbCertLogon->Pin.Buffer=(PWSTR)(pbPinBuffer-pbAuthInfo);pKerbCertLogon->CspData=(PUCHAR)(pbCspData pbAuthInfo)?就是这样!谢谢!从文档中我完全看不到这一点,而且它与LsaLogonUser一起工作的事实使我没有质疑auth打包代码。